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Into much recent discussion there enters, in some aspect or
other, the controversy as to what place the mental system shall
be accorded in psychological science. The problem reappears
in many guises and general statements as well as particular
working conceptions have been formulated regarding it. The
preliminary chapters of text-books customarily define the
author's position in the matter, and in numerous papers and
addresses of late special modifications of the psychological con-
ception of mind and reconstructions of the limiting criteria by
which the field of investigation is determined have been made.
The older psychology was not troubled by doubt in regard
to these matters. It defined psychology in terms which gave
a precise formal limitation to its field; and since, supported
by philosophical and theological assumptions, the distribution
of its subject-matter was restricted to mankind and approached
by a purely introspective method, the maintenance of a clear
demarcation of its province from that of adjacent sciences
presented no great difficulty. The relation of consciousness to
physical structures and changes was incidental not essential.
The soul in its temporary alliance made use of the body as an
instrument, but in action as well as quality was ultimately
independent of the latter. It was not considered in reference
to either a determining stimulus or a necessary reaction. In
itself the mind composed a unity of functions and the object
in studying it was to determine the place of each of these func-
tions in a rational system. Psychology was thus concerned
with the logical problem of the mind's constitution and its
direction in ideal activity.
In this conception of mind as a self-contained system of
phenomena whose limits are stated strictly in terms of con-
sciousness psychology has concurred in its more recent defini-
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tions as well. The formulations with which current text-books
introduce their subject-matter adhere to this postulate. Psy-
chology is the science of self and the facts of self as manifested
in individual experience; it is concerned with psychical phe-
nomena, conscious processes or psychoses; the description and
explanation of the phenomena of mind or consciousness is its
aim. In these mental activities and conscious states as such
psychological interest centers. Its business is the systematic
exploration, under the methods which inductive science im-
poses, of the constitiuton of mind and its internal correlations.
This substitutes an empirical study—systematically di-
rected introspection under experimental control—for the logical
reflection upon which earlier rational psychology depended.
Nevertheless its field is denned in similar terms, as the system
of psychical activities or phenomena. The psycho-physical
correlations which may exist, whether conditioning or depend-
ent, are incidental to the discussion. The study of stimulus
and reaction may be helpful in many ways to psychological
science, but with neither of these, if we adhere to the implica-
tions of such current definitions, is the latter directly con-
cerned. It is the reaction in consciousness which follows
external stimulation or physiological change in the one case,
and in the other the mental complex which, generically or in
particular, precedes a given form of reaction that alone affords
material for psychological study.
But in the more recent development of the science this
conception has undergone a variety of modifications due in
part to natural changes accompanying the extension from
within of the field of psychological investigation, and in part
caused by external pressure through the study, from the stand-
point of independent sciences, of those phenomena with which
the correlations of mind bring it into contact. The movement
from within has been a complex one. Its most obvious con-
stituent is to be found in the development of comparative
psychology and its extension both of the experimental method
of study and of the guiding conceptions of psychology until by
a succession of rapid strides the whole animal kingdom from
man to protozoan had been included within its field of research.
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The enormous multiplication of individual types to be
studied, in which this extension has resulted, is accompanied
by a still more profoundly modifying factor, namely the ex-
treme qualitative variety of the forms of consciousness to
which in the course of his work the psychologist must adapt
his conceptions. The simple and precise formulae which
served the earlier human and classic psychology fall to pieces
when the psychic life of microorganisms is to be included along
with the complex and highly articulated consciousness of man
in a common system. This problem has been met, by the
psychologist himself, in a variety of ways. To one phase he
has responded by simplifying and universalizing the essential
constitutents of the unity of consciousness, as when the exist-
ence of irritability, discriminative selection and adaptive re-
action, demonstrated in the simplest organic types, are con-
strued as a manifestation of the psychological trinity—affec-
tion, cognition and volition. To another aspect of the problem
he has reacted by substituting for this unitary system of com-
mon characters the conception of individual mental functions,
such as sensitivity, organic memory, space-orientation, learning
by imitation, and the like, the evolutionary history of each
being traced as the succession of organic forms is passed in
review. In a similar way the comparative psychologist has
modified his working conceptions to meet still other demands
imposed by the continuous extension of his field.
A second general constituent in this modifying process is
to be found in the complication of phenomena by which the
psychological student is confronted within the limits of human
experience itself, or of the human type. In this field extension
has taken three general directions. The first is from the normal
through the exceptional, abnormal and pathological to the
final disintegration of the unitary self in individual impulses,
elementary idea-systems and persistent reaction-types. This
field has hitherto been the most productive of such supple-
mentary modifications. It has occasioned the conceptions of
subliminal or subconscious phenomena, of psychic disaggrega-
tion and split-off selves, of motor and psychic automatisms,
with a host of other working hypotheses.
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The other extensions lead, the one downward through sub-
. normal and defective types, imbeciles and idiots, towards a
limit which the anencephalous monster may be taken to repre-
sent; and the other backward from adulthood to youth and
infancy, and from foetal to embryonic conditions until, in the
fertilized ovum, it meets the comparative psychologist on
common ground in dealing with a simple undifferentiated
organism. The need of devising, in the service of continuity,
an adequate system of conceptions thus receives a new and
greater emphasis.
All these demands have arisen from within in the course of
the psychologist's own work; but to the readjustments by
which they have been met he has been urged by an independent
and extraneous stimulus. This also has had a complex char-
acter, covering both systems of physical change with which
mental activity is correlated, the field of the stimulus and that
of the reaction.
The study of the physical conditions of consciousness, es-
pecially of its physiological locus, has been approached in
independence of any primary interest in mental phenomena.
While the psychologist has availed himself largely of the results
both of physical and physiological research in the technical
arrangement of his problems as well as in the correlation of
results, he has not been hampered with any confusion, as to
aims or methods, between the general province of physics and
that of his own special studies. The science of optics, for
example, is not confounded with the study of space perception
nor climatology with psychic reaction to weather changes. In
the case of physiology, however, the uniformity of association
between the primary series of reactions in nervous and other
tissues and the mental activities with which the psychologist
deals has led to the inclusion of the latter group of facts within
the system of phenomena which, in the most general sense,
is to be considered. For physiology these mental reactions
can never become an independent system coordinate with the
neural processes, and the account it gives of them assumes their
dependence upon physiological changes throughout. Thus the
psychosis is conceived not as a psychological object but merely
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as one product of nervous action, and its treatment constitutes
only a highly specialized topic within physiology at large.
The study of sensory stimulation in all its forms and of the
mechanism of simple and complex reaction-types has been so
extensive in recent years and the mass of detailed information
it has afforded concerning psycho-physiological correlation has
been of such importance to psychology that physiological
methods and conceptions have attained dominance in this field
even with psychologists. A sketch of the nervous system and
its functions is made the introduction to psychological study;
mental processes are explained in terms of nervous habits and
rearrangements; in general, a treatment of the direct psycho-
logical relation of experience to the external world as condition
and object of the will's reactions is replaced by speculative
constructions of its physiological relation to mediating processes
in the central nervous system. These modifications in the
psychologist's working conception often involve more than a
reformulation of criteria and amount to a plain confusion be-
tween the standpoints of independent sciences.
The second of these two external influences proceeds from
the biological study of reactions. The biologist not infre-
quently makes use of the physiological method in his work,
and a rigid application of his own postulates would perhaps
require the application of this conception throughout; but, as
distinguished from the latter, ecological biology is concerned
not with the special mechanisms of reaction but with their
teleological relations. It construes the response of the organ-
ism in terms of its serviceableness to some end, and its object
is to determine the complex of adaptations which thus char-
acterizes the systematic reactions of any given type or indi-
vidual. Each organism maintains certain permanent relations
with the environment. Its energies are directed to securing
food, shelter, warmth, protection and alliance—in a word,
provision for the satisfaction of certain needs and desires.
Each reaction may therefore be conceived in terms of its
approximation to the realization of those conditions which
determine the maintenance of these relations in an ideal form.
Many such adaptive reactions we know to be pervaded by
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consciousness; to a much greater range we impute the same
general character to them, and it may perhaps be questioned
whether the terms in which the biologist defines his object
have, in strictness, any meaning apart from the implications
of consciousness and its values. But at least the biologist
does not start from this assumption. Reaction consciously
directed to an end is but a special form of response having its
place in a more general field of organic adaptation with which,
as a whole, the science is concerned. Biology, in this phase of
its work, is the science of behavior, whether behavior be con-
strued in terms of consciousness or not.
In recent years, as the systematic study of life in its eco-
logical relations has extended, it has been brought into more
intimate as well as more extensive contact with the system of
phenomena which functional psychology considers in its study
of mental adaptation. Especially is this true in the case of
comparative psychology where method is necessarily objective.
These two sciences may be said to have come face to face in
the study of animal behavior. The results in this field have
been similar to those already pointed out. The difficulty of
securing a satisfactory criterion for determining the distribution
of consciousness, especially in view of the apparent variability
in its association with a given function, and the sense of identity
in the fundamental nature of behavior in all organic species has
led to modifications not merely in the formulas applied to par-
ticular types of life but to a recasting of the terms in which the
subject-matter itself is stated—for example, when the scope of
psychology is defined as a study of 'organosis' in its most
general application.
In this new approximation towards a neighboring science
the primary conception from which procedure starts is again
objective, but instead of the conditioning stimulus it is now
the consequent reaction which becomes the determining ele-
ment. Behavior must always be considered, it need not be
said, as well as physiological function and external stimulus.
The mind is historically and socially conditioned in reaction
as well as incitement, and its materials of expression must be
regarded equally with its provoking stimuli. This modifica-
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tion, however, goes farther than to employ the form of response
as a means of interpreting the subjective attitude. It proposes
a study of the objective rearrangement in its effects upon the
conditions of life as a substitute for the inquiry into the forms
of conscious activity by which, under certain limitations, such
readjustments are characterized.
In still other connections the same general question as to
the nature of the system of facts with which psychology is
actually concerned has been raised. One of these may be used
to point the consideration which all in common provoke, since
it is not dependent upon the complex extensions of recent
psychological investigation into fields which bring it into con-
tact with the physical and biological sciences but has been
introduced as a comment upon the earlier classic method of
introspection by the normal human mind. It is the query
concerning what is actually meant by the terms mind and
experience, mental facts and mental laws, as psychology con-
ceives them.
In this particular modification of the central psychological
conception mind is construed as the system of characteristics
and habits which the individual presents in his reaction to
stimuli. It is what the mind does, not what it is, which is
here considered; and what it does is expressed in its attitudes
and social reactions. What comes under review by the psy-
chologist, according to this conception, is not the form and con-
ditions of the mental activity as such but its logical and prac-
tical aspects, its products and consequences. These lie open
in some degree to even the casual observer, and the intimate
companion of any man is in a position to make a comprehensive
system of judgments concerning the character of his mind in
this sense of the term. It is thus we learn the habits and
character of the individual, the range and accuracy of his
knowledge; by observing the plans he has formed and carried
out or given up we judge his originating and organizing capacity
and his tenacity of purpose; similarly^ we may know his pre-
dilections in a multitude of affairs and be familiar with his
general tastes and desires.
But it may be questioned whether in the existence or
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acquisition of such knowledge the essential attitude of the
psychologist is at all embodied, for it rests primarily upon the
determination of relations between two objective series, that
of the stimulus and that of the reaction; and leaves in doubt
the place of the intermediate system of mental activites from
which the psychologist takes his departure. Now there are
two distinct points of view from which mind or experience
may be conceived; the one regards the qualitative, the other
the relational aspect. The first of these standpoints is some-
times called the subjective, the second the objective point of
regard.
Under the first conception immediate, irreducible experience
is intended, the fact, namely, that existence has at each moment
a unique qualitative character which constitutes it a moment in
the concrete history of an individual subject. In its raw im-
mediacy one thus knows yellow, noise, cold and pain; one
feels satiety, longing and dislike. With this character a second
subject cannot be brought face to face, nor can it be shared
with him. The experience of another simply is not, and cannot
become, my experience; no adequacy of constructive inter-
pretation, no sense of sympathetic intimacy, no accordance
in social reaction will annul this fact. My mind is not obscured
from the view of other minds, when I conceive mind in this
way, because of the complexity of its workings or the devious-
ness of its course, but because—to continue the figure—it is
not at all a visible object. It is hidden because it is inaccessible.
To know another mind, in this sense of the word, is to be that
other; that is to say, it is to deny the fact of otherness and to
bring the event in question within the category of immediate
experience. Whatever the status of this qualitative aspect of
existence in reference to any specific problem, and whether it
concerns the psychologist's work or not, the uniqueness and
exclusiveness of subjective immediacy in each individual expe-
rience is a fact to be recognized, not a theory to be discussed.
From the second standpoint mind is treated in terms of its
relations to the objective world. Whatever the qualitative
aspect of any experience it springs from certain stimuli and
results in specific reactions. It is in these physical and social
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connections that the observer is interested. His point of de-
parture is in a system of reality lying beyond the experience
of the moment and his return is to that larger world again.
The mind, in this case, is but the point where a stimulus has
effect and a reaction is originated. To know it means to be
acquainted with the characteristic response which is made by
it to any situation. When this response is conceived in terms
of the physical reactions necessary to the maintenance of life
and of the social adaptations of which our fellow-men can take
account, it is not essential that the qualitative nature of the
experience as it exists for the subject should be taken into
account. In the reckoning which the observer makes the
mental system may be ignored, for it is the characteristic
reactions to which it leads in their objective and social forms
alone in which he is interested. So long as his knowledge of
the sequential connections between typical stimuli and the
responses which the individual makes to them is secured the
immediate quality of experience which mediates between the
two series is negligible.
Such knowledge may even be more exact and complete
when the observer is a bystander than when he is himself the
subject of the experience. The occupancy of the locus of expe-
rience in no way ensures an acquaintance with the real char-
acter of the mind in this sense of the term. One's estimate of
his own capacities may be farther astray than that of the im-
partial onlooker, and his reaction in any given case may surprise
him as really as his acquaintance. It is indeed the latter to
whom we look for a sound judgment in regard to such a matter,
for he is undisturbed by that emotional excitement which is
inseparable from personal experience and unoccupied with
attention to the purely subjective aspect of the situation from
which the experient can never wholly free himself.
If we regard the mind from this objective standpoint it is
obviously neither inaccessible nor hidden. One's character is
recognized as widely as acquaintance extends. To one person
it is known less fully than to another; to one this series of re-
actions is more familiar than that, and thus individual estimates
of character vary; but to all alike the data for such knowledge
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are accessible, the subject himself having simply the position
of one observer among an indifferent many.
But this way of dealing with reactions is obviously defec-
tive, whether it be considered practically or theoretically, since
knowledge of the situation involved is incomplete in regard to
stimulus and reaction alike. For the stimulus is not the object
as it exists for the onlooking individual or is objectively denned;
it is the object as presented in the experience of the subject
himself. The reaction, similarly, is not the gross physical
movement or socially discernible adaptation; it is the whole
attitude of the self aroused by the situation which is thus pre-
sented. A full description of the stimulus in physical terms
is indeed conceivable, but this cannot rest upon any analysis
of the constitution of the external object alone; it must include
the organic reaction which this stimulus provokes and thus be
finally stated in physiological terms. The reaction, likewise, if
its full description in physical terms is attempted, must be con-
ceived as the whole complex readjustment, peripheral and
central, which the physiological stimulus has evoked. That
such a multiplicity of elements of physical change exists, oc-
curring in the body at large and constituting a physiological
analogue to both the complex mental situation which is pre-
sented and to the reaction in consciousness which it occasions,
is a methodological assumption and not a field of data accessible
throughout its range and utilizable by the observer in making
up his account. This holds true also in regard to practical
affairs, for the onlooker is constantly driven to recognize the
insufficiency of his knowledge of the real stimulus to which
response is made, and the incompleteness of his acquaintance
with the reaction itself.
Thus even when the observer's interest lies wholly outside
the limits of individual experience the subject's report of any
situation is indispensable to the completion of his data. If he
had possession of all the facts regarding either the physiological
effects of the stimulus or the final readjustment within the
body which it arouses he might be able to predict the reaction
upon the physical or social environment, but such knowledge is
inaccessible and the only alternative is to find how the situation
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presented itself to the subject in question and what his real
and complete response to it was, whether such response resulted
in the immediate production of changes observable by the on-
looker or not.
The psychologist's standpoint cannot be identified with
either of the points of view above described. Each individual
experience possesses a subjective quality which is at once un-
sharable and indescribable. It bears also certain relations
to both antecedents and consequents in the external world
which it is practically important that the subject and his fellow-
men alike should understand. But the psychologist is occupied
neither in demonstrating the qualitative uniqueness of each
individual experience nor in tracing its practical consequences
in the form of movements. His standpoint is subjective but
not qualitative; it is relational but not objective. The first
of the two points of view above described is subjective and
qualitative, the second is relational and objective, while that
of the psychologist is subjective and relational. His study is
of facts which cannot be objectively discerned, though their
existence may under certain conditions be inferred from objec-
tive data, but the facts thus revealed through intuition he treats
in terms of their relations, in whatever direction these rela-
tions lead him.
In general the plexus of connections in which any individual
experience stands may be treated in terms of a three-fold
grouping. The first of these is the relation of antecedence, in
which the experience is studied in connection with its condi-
tions, whether these lie within the course of previous experience
or derive from the external world in the form of so-called
stimuli. The second is the relation of reciprocity, including
the material study of the constituents of each individual expe-
rience and the formal study of resemblances and correlations
among the phases of such experience. The third and last is
the relation of consequence, in which the influence of the event
upon both the course of subsequent experience and the forms of
expression by which mental activity is characterized are
studied.
The second of these three groups is, by definition, restricted
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to the immediate phenomena of subjective experience. It con-
forms most closely to the conceptions and methods of the
earlier introspective psychology. In contemporary science the
observation of it is systematically controlled and extended
statistically. In comparison with the traditional conception
of mental constitution its scheme has consequently undergone
both complication and reconstruction; but in general data
and products this part of psychology remains essentially un-
modified. It is an analysis of the psychic system itself to
determine its constituents and the forms of their combination
in the various orders of synthesis by which mind is character-
ized. Concerning this part of the psychologist's work, there-
fore, disagreement is not likely to arise.
It is in the first and third of the foregoing sections, in which
the two-fold correlation of consciousness with its physical
environment is treated, that the danger exists of obscuring if
not obliterating the fundamental conception which both defines
the subject-matter and determines the limits of psychology.
In these fields of study, quite as much as in connection with
that central system of facts to which normal introspection
has been directed from the beginning, consciousness with what-
ever that term implies must remain the final point of reference
if psychology is to have any independent existence. Otherwise
its province will simply be parted between physiology which
invades its field from the side of the stimulus and biology which
encroaches from that of the reaction. For psychology these
correlations of consciousness are necessarily secondary and
contingent. To assume either correlative as a dominant con-
ception, that is, to define the province of investigation in terms
of the stimulus-field or of the reaction-system, carries one
beyond the circle of psychic phenomena into the world of
physical materials and their changes, and to combine the two
•as is the tendency in much contemporary writing makes of
psychology a pseudo-science created merely by taking slices
from two independent sciences and combining them. The
maintenance of psychology rests upon a clear definition of its
aim as a science and a perception that the system of conscious-
ness presents a substantial and unitary subject-matter which
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cannot be dissipated in a confused treatment of individual
topics in physics, anatomy, physiology, biology and anthro-
pology.
If, however, just this solution of continuity is to be avoided
the centrality of consciousness must never be lost sight of.
This thesis has two points of application; the first touches the
substantial existence of the mental system as the primary field
of psychology, and the second concerns its primacy as an inter-
pretative criterion in the treatment of its physical correlations.
In the first place, then, the objective point of view is not ho-
mologous with the standpoint of psychology. Practical inter-
est seeks only adaptation, whether it deal with things or men.
It is concerned not with the mechanism of any change in itself
but with its products or effects, and when it has to deal with
minds it treats them in accordance with this general aim,
classifying all reactions in terms of their relations to stimuli
which constitute their nearest antecedents in the discernible
series of changes which the objective world presents.
If now we can say that a given stimulus inevitably arouses
the mental reaction in question and from such a mental re-
action these physical consequences and no others proceed, the
middle term which is thus repeated may be dropped from the
series and the first and last terms connected directly. Towards
this general conclusion all the conceptions above described tend.
The field of actual transformations is reduced to the two
physical systems and their contact is marked only by a theo-
retical division. But in the system of reality mind is not a mere
point where stimulus and reaction meet, as these various modi-
fications imply when carried to their logical conclusion. It is
psychologically an "interposed system in which the stimulus-
field terminates and the reaction-system has its origin; and it is
the existence of this mediating system which constitutes both
the ground and limitation of the science. This interposition,
as already indicated, implies no interruption of continuity; it
is not a metaphysical solution but a methodological subdivision
of reality which it involves.
Consciousness, in other words, does not possess an inde-
pendent field which can be contrasted with that of stimulus
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and reaction loci. It not only has a physical correlation in the
physiological system of activities but may even be described
as the flooding of these two fields with ideal values and direc-
tion. Nevertheless it both constitutes in itself a definite and
complex system of phenomena and affords the only means by
which an approach can be made to the problem of stating in
its fulness the nature of either stimulus or reaction. This
system, therefore, instead of receding to the vanishing-point
becomes for psychology the central field of exploration within
which repeated and extended analysis, by indirect as well as
by direct means, reveals an endlessly increasing complexity
and integration.
The second application of this thesis is in the psychologist's
treatment of the physical changes with which consciousness is
correlated whether as antecedent or consequent. It may be
stated by saying that the conception of consciousness and its
implications affords the determining reference which both de-
fines the field to which the psychologist limits his activity
and supplies the qualitative criterion which guides his work.
The systematic reference of consciousness, as already indicated,
is to the stimulus-field on the one hand and to the reaction-
system on the other, and it has no third and independent
theater of activity. But in the psychological treatment of
these two groups of phenomena consciousness must remain a
determining conception. The stimulus enters within the circle
of consideration only when it ceases to be regarded in terms
of physical change and is treated as the antecedent of a specific
qualitative consciousness. The reaction, likewise, becomes
subject-matter for psychology only when it is no longer con-
ceived as a movement or material reconstruction but is con-
strued as the embodiment of a particular mental attitude.
In both of these cases the situation, as psychologically con-
ceived, is made to turn upon the presence of consciousnses as
its cardinal point. The stimulus is that which provokes mental
activity, the response that which expresses it. Thus it assumes
as its foundation the existence of affective sensibility and
conative tendencies, of hedonic values and preferential reaction
in the organism which thus responds to stimulation. To con-
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sider irritability in the physiological meaning of the term alone,
or reaction as organosis in the general sense of an adaptation
which is not based upon consciousness is to relinquish this
constitutive assumption and to make the implication of con-
sciousness an incident in a larger system. But for the psychol-
ogist the elimination of consciousness in this way is simply
pouring out the baby with the bath, and in all valid extension
of his science or its underlying assumptions it will be found on
closer inspection that this conception still functions.
The psychologist does indeed study the whole system of
specific stimuli, whether physical or physiological, which acts
upon the senses, as well as the characteristic reactions which
the organism makes to them; but these are never, as a matter
of fact, construed by him in thoroughgoing mechanical terms.
It is the reactions of living creatures in which he is interested
and the stimuli he considers are those only to which such
organisms are irritable. Every force may logically be called a
stimulus or reagent and every substance upon which it impinges
may be said to present a reaction in the rearrangement of its
physical relations which follows the collision. But no one
advocates a modification in our conception of mental science
which will make it coextensive with this whole field. Such an
extension appears only in the metaphysical universalization of
concepts, with which psychology as a special science has nothing
to do.
Even within the field of organic life itself a division obtains
between activities which are conceived to fall within the
limits of psychological phenomena and those which are ex-
cluded from consideration. The former are not restricted to
reactions dependent upon the coordination of many individual
muscle groups, which can be construed only as reflecting the
unity of the organism as a whole, but include also certain
adaptive responses mediated by single organs and directed to
the readjustment of the relations of that organ individually.
Reflex action may be taken to represent this group. This
conception, however, is not extended to the whole range of
changes occurring within the organism. Absorption, osmosis
and the chemical syntheses of nutrition are excluded from the
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circle of phenomena which psychology treats. If the question
be raised why these forms of reaction, together with such
activities as capillary attraction and the selection and rear-
rangement of materials in the growing crystal, are thus ex-
cluded from consideration the distribution will be seen to turn
upon the fact that in the case of these physical and metabolic
reconstructions it has been found possible to treat the phe-
nomena in purely mechanical terms as movements and com-
binations depending upon physical forces alone.
In its most extended form psychological treatment is thus
still restricted to the sentient world. It is consciousness, in
its most elementary forms indeed, but still consciousness,
which determines where the line shall be drawn and not mere
readjustment in the relations which characterize the system
of physical materials. If any of the forms of change enumer-
ated above, osmosis, absorption, etc., are included by any
particular scientist it will be found that for him these proc-
esses are either steeped in consciousness at the moment of
their occurrence, as for example, the activity of the organic
cell at large has been conceived, or they are regarded as per-
manent forms of reaction the development of which has been
mediated by consciousness in the past.
The system of habits represents this problem generically.
The psychological student finds it necessary to contrast habitual
reaction with the selective activity of consciousness. The
formation of habit is marked by the progressive decline in
directive attention. In its more established types it has
already passed beyond the field of choice and control, while
its theoretical limit is a complete dissociation from conscious
activity, a condition which is at least approximated in the
so-called vital functions, digestion, circulation and the like.
The automatisms of habit therefore present in the highest
degree the phenomena whose treatment these psychological
extensions have been designed to serve. They are highly
specialized adaptations in which the response to stimulation
is direct and simple, depending upon no interposed activity
of consciousness. As organic reactions they have teleological
significance but they are independent of a psychical correlate.
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If the field of psychology is to be redefined in terms of bio-
logical adaptation instead of mental process habit-automatisms
seem to constitute at once the immediate occasion and sufficient
justification for the change.
Nevertheless habit, which is tenaciously retained within
the sphere of psychological discussion, maintains its place
simply in virtue of the necessary relation to the selective and
organizing activities of consciousness which is predicated of it.
Though any given reaction of this type be now dissociated
from consciousness and bring about by purely mechanical
processes a teleological readjustment to changes in the external
world it still logically falls to the psychologist to discuss it if
it be thus construed as a product of consciousness, namely
as a permanent reaction-type developed through the selective
and organizing reactions of an antecedent mental activity.
In this construction of habit, in which contemporary psychol-
ogy at large agrees, the centrality of consciousness is main-
tained, for the habit-form is viewed in the light of psychic
values and direction.
The application of this conception in the progressive exten-
sion of the field of psychological data is by no means restricted
to the immediate reactions of the organism. It determines that
growing system of investigations into culture and social his-
tory which depends upon the interpretation of permanent
products of human activity, such as the monuments of literary
and plastic art, or the industrial inventions and general mate-
rial transformations which have been brought about in the
service of mankind. These are legitimate fields of psycholog-
ical inquiry because—and only because—of the implications
of consciousness by which their treatment is everywhere
suffused.
Wherever this underlying principle is applied the psy-
chological point of view is assumed and the phenomenon
becomes a datum for the science. It must therefore be said,
I believe, that those investigations in which organic stimula-
tion and reaction have been studied by other than physico-
chemical methods involve the implication of consciousness,
whether carried on by physiologists and biologists or by psy-
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chologists themselves, and must in consequence be classed
as psychological inquiries in the strict sense of the term. In
some cases doubtless the application of this principle is due
to confusion, but in others the scientist is under no illusion
as to the nature of his work. Psychological science was first
laid under obligation to physiology in this field, and that the
debt is great as well as obvious a mere list of its contributors
sufficiently indicates. More recently the tide has turned in
the direction of biology whose students now hold the same
general relation to experimental psychology which physi-
ology possessed a generation ago. It may be assumed that
an equal enrichment of the science is to be expected from this
side also, and one which will react to the advancement of
biology and its conceptions as physiological psychology
has influenced the study of physiology. But in this general
extension of knowledge it would be the very irony of fate if
psychology were to lose sight of those distinctive conceptions
upon which her existence as a science rests through a failure
to apprehend the fact that all this constitutes primarily an
enrichment of her own system of data, and that without such
a fundamental reference to the forms and values of conscious-
ness it can have no logical existence.
